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Congressional Control of U. S. Supreme Court
Jurisdiction
George H. Faust*
S ENATE BILL No. 2646 proposed in the Congress is unprece-
dented in scope.' If it is enacted the Supreme Court will be
reduced to a virtual nullity.2 Displeasure with recent decisions
of the Court has engendered an attack upon its status which
strikes at its vitals. This article is an analysis of the bill and the
types of cases over which the Supreme Court would no longer
have appellate jurisdiction.
Appellate Jurisdiction in General
The Supreme Court shall have no jurisdiction to review,
either by appeal, writ of certiorari, or otherwise, any case
where there is drawn into question the validity of....
The Supreme Court was brought into being by the judiciary
article of the Constitution and is invested with judicial power
only. But its appellate jurisdiction is conferred "with such ex-
ceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make." 3
Apparently the first time Congress withdrew appellate juris-
diction from the Supreme Court in order to prevent a decision
on the constitutionality of a particular act occurred in Ex parte
McCardle. William McCardle, a southern editor, was arrested
under the Reconstruction Act of 1867 and was held under mili-
tary custody. An appeal was made to the Supreme Court for
writ of habeas corpus. The cause was argued but not decided
when Congress, fearing that the Reconstruction Acts might be
declared unconstitutional, enacted legislation in 1868 which with-
drew from the Court jurisdiction on appeal on habeas corpus
which had been granted in the act of 1867. In the decision of the
Court, the following was stated:
* Member of the Ohio Bar; A.B., Henderson State Teachers College; M.A.,
University of Arkansas; Ph.D., University of Chicago; LL.B., Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
1 S. 2646 was introduced in the 85th Congress, 1st Session, by Mr. Jenner
in the Senate of the United States.
2 Sutherland, the Supreme Court, 1956 Term, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 85 (1957);
Fairman, the Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 83 (1956).
3 Article 3, Section 2, U. S. Constitution.
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* * ' the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is not de-
rived from acts of Congress. It is strictly speaking, con-
ferred by the Constitution. But it is conferred "with such
exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall
make." 4
Through the years, the Court has taken further cognizance
of the authority of Congress to grant and withdraw appellate
jurisdiction. In 1952, the Court held that "When a law confer-
ring jurisdiction is repealed without any reservations of juris-
diction over pending cases, all pending cases fall with the law." 5
Since the Constitution places no limit to the "exceptions" and
"regulations" that Congress may make, that body could con-
stitutionally deprive the Supreme Court of all its appellate juris-
diction, leaving it only its meager original jurisdiction.
Appellate Jurisdiction and Congressional Committees
The proposed measure would not deprive the Court of all
appellate jurisdiction but would withdraw such jurisdiction over
an appreciable body of fundamental law where there is drawn
into question the validity of:
(1) function or purpose, of, or the jurisdiction of, any
committee or sub-committee of the United States Congress,
or any action or proceeding against a witness charged with
contempt of Congress;
The sweep of this proviso is seen in Watkins v. United
States.6 In that case, petitioner was convicted, under an Act of
Congress, for "contempt of Congress," when he refused to tell
a committee whether or not he knew certain persons to have
been members of the Communist Party in the past. Watkins
refused to answer on the basis that the question was beyond the
authority of the committee. The Act of Congress under which
he was convicted defined a crime as the refusal to answer "any
question pertinent to the question under inquiry."
The Supreme Court, in reversing the conviction, held that
Congressional power to investigate is not unlimited and that
there is no general authority to expose the private affairs of in-
dividuals without justification in terms of the function of Con-
4 Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869).
5 Bruner v. United States, 343 U. S. 112 (1952). Also see, The Assessors v.
Osborne, 9 Wall. 567, 575 (1870); The Francis Wright, N. Y., 105 U. S. 386
(1882); Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464
(1939).
6 354 U. S. 174 (1957).
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gress. Elaborating further, the Court explained that in conduct-
ing investigations, Congress is not a law enforcement or trial
agency, and no inquiry is an end in itself, but the quest must be
related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of Congress.
The witness must have knowledge of the subject to which the
interrogation is deemed pertinent and the questions must be put
"with the same degree of explicitness and clarity that the Due
Process Clause requires in the expression of any element of a
criminal offense."
Furthermore, the Court held that under a statute penalizing
one for contempt of Congress, the Courts must accord to the de-
fendant every right guaranteed in all other criminal offenses.
The Bill of Rights is applicable to all forms of governmental ac-
tion, and a witness before a committee cannot be compelled to
give evidence against himself, and is not subject to unusual
search and seizure. The freedoms of speech, press, religion,
political belief, and association secured by the First Amendment
cannot be abridged by any Congressional Committee.
By precluding review by the Supreme Court, uniformity of
law pertaining to the issues in question would be unlikely, for
there could be eleven different sets of decisions, one for each of
the separate federal appellate judicial districts. This is the an-
tithesis of the purpose for which the Supreme Court was created. 7
Appellate Jurisdiction and Federal Employment
(2) any action, function, or practice of, or the juris-
diction of, any officer or agency of the executive branch of
the Federal Government in the administration of any pro-
gram established pursuant to an Act of Congress or other-
wise for the elimination from service as employees in the
executive branch of individuals whose retention may impair
the security of the United States Government;
Three cases graphically illustrate this section. In Peters v.
Hobby," the petitioner was employed as a special consultant in
a federal agency. After having been cleared twice by the
agency's own loyalty board, the Civil Service Commission's
Loyalty Review Board, established pursuant to an Executive
Order, acted on its own motion and stated that it had reasonable
doubt as to the petitioner's loyalty, and notified him that he was
barred from all federal service for a period of three years.
7 The Federalist No. LXXX, by Alexander Hamilton.
8 349 U. S. 331 (1955).
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On appeal the Supreme Court announced that the actions
of the Commission's Loyalty Review Board were invalid in that
it was guilty of an unwarranted assumption of power. It had
no authority to review rulings which had been favorable to em-
ployees or to adjudicate individual cases on its own motion.
Although loyalty proceedings may not involve the imposition of
criminal sanctions, the limitations on the Board's power to re-
view adverse determinations is in keeping with the deeply rooted
principle of criminal law that a verdict of guilty is appealable
while a verdict of acquittal is not.
In addition, the above mentioned Loyalty Review Board did
not comply with the rule established for itself which debars em-
ployees from "the competitive service" within three years after
a final determination "that he is disqualified on loyalty grounds."
The Commission's order extended to all federal employment and
became effective before the agency had made "final determina-
tion." Finally, the court held that the petitioner was entitled to
have all the proceedings expunged from the records of the Civil
Service Commission.
Similarly, in Service v. Dulles9 the Court ruled that even
though the Secretary of State was authorized by statute to dis-
charge employees in his absolute discretion, it was unlawful for
the Secretary to discharge an employee contrary to his own
regulation limiting his discretion. In this case the Secretary
acted "solely as a result of the finding of disloyalty of the Loyalty
Review Board and as a result of [his] review of the opinion of
that Board," which was in contravention of the regulations he
had issued relating to loyalty and security which authorized dis-
charge only after "unfavorable action in the employee's case by
the Department Loyalty Review Board." Inasmuch as this stat-
ute had been reenacted without change subsequent to the estab-
lishment of the Secretary's self-imposed regulations for dis-
charge, the Court concluded that so long as the Regulations re-
mained unchanged he could not lawfully proceed without regard
to them. Consequently, regulations established by the Secretary
are binding upon him as well as all covered by their terms.
By an act of Congress in 1950, heads of certain govern-
mental agencies were given power of summary suspension and
unreviewable dismissal over civil-service employees. This power
was to be used "in the interest of national security" and to ex-
tend to "all other departments and agencies of the Government"
9 354 U. S. 128 (1957).
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by Executive Order. In Cole v. Young, 10 petitioner was sus-
pended on charges of close association with alleged Communists
and allegedly subversive organizations. Subsequently, he was
dismissed from employment on the basis that his employment
was not "clearly consistent with the interests of national se-
curity."
All was resolved in the following questions: What is the
relation between the position held and "national security"?
What is the risk to "national security" that the employees' re-
tention would create? Under the act "national security" was
not defined, but the import of the term refers to security of the
nation from subversion or aggression, and not to general wel-
fare. Before the power of suspension or dismissal is operative
the Government must show the position held as being one affect-
ing "national security." Such relation not being established, the
Government failed to prove its case and the ambiguity must be
resolved in favor of the petitioner.
Appellate Jurisdiction and Subversion
(3) any statute or executive regulation of any State
the general purpose of which is to control subversive activi-
ties within such State;
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania enacted its own Sedi-
tion Act. The United States Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v.
Nelson" announced that the Federal Government had pre-
empted the field by the Smith Act.12 Defendant was arrested
and convicted in Pennsylvania as a member of the Communist
Party under the terms of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act. But
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the state Sedition
Act was superseded by the Smith Act of 1940, as amended in
1948, which prohibits the knowing advocacy of overthrow of the
Government by force and violence.
The United States Supreme Court declared that the scheme
of federal regulation was so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that the Congress left no room for the states to sup-
plement it. The federal statutes touch a field in which the fed-
eral interest is so dominant that the federal system must be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
10 351 U. S. 536 (1956).
11 350 U. S. 497 (1956).
12 The Smith Act of 1940; Security Act of 1950; and, Communist Control
Act of 1954.
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subject. Moreover, enforcement must be initiated by federal
officials and not by individuals in their private capacity. In
addition sporadic enforcement is prevented and the law cannot
be used for purposes of personal spite and hatred. The defense
of the nation is national in scope, and security must not be
undertaken by private and local groups.
At the time of hearing by the Supreme Court there were
forty-two states, plus Alaska and Hawaii, with sedition laws,
and these were not uniform. Some laws were without any safe-
guards for a defendant, some punished an individual for mem-
bership only, and there were conflicting rules of procedure
which produced incompatible results.
If the forty-eight or forty-nine states and territories were
permitted to have their own statutes on security there could be
as many different enactments with rules for procedure and safe-
guards or the lack of them, as there are areas in addition to the
federal law. There could be about 50 different sets of interpreta-
tions on this vital issue. The likelihood of uniformity of laws
would be reduced to the minimum, making possible different and
conflicting results. An additional danger would be present in the
multiple punishments possible under the same set of circum-
stances.
Appellate Jurisdiction and Education
(4) any rule, bylaw, or regulation adopted by a school
board, board of education, board of trustees, or similar body,
concerning subversive activities in its teaching body;
In Wieman v. Updegraff1 the Court faced the following
issue. The State of Oklahoma required a loyalty oath of all
state officers and employees. Under the statute, the fact of mem-
bership in certain organizations alone was sufficient to disqualify
one from employment. A professor of Oklahoma Agricultural
and Mechanical College failed to take the oath in the time re-
quired and Updegraff brought a taxpayers' suit to prevent pay-
ment of wages to the professor. The legislation was attacked on
the ground that it was a bill of attainder; that it was an ex post
facto law; and, that it impaired the obligation of an employee's
contract with the state and violated the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court held that the applicability of the act
solely on the fact of membership in certain organizations was
13 344 U. S. 183 (1952).
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unconstitutional. Membership could be innocent and the classifi-
cation of innocent and guilty together was arbitrary. Conse-
quently, a state, in attempting to bar disloyal individuals from
its employment, solely on the basis of organizational member-
ship, regardless of knowledge concerning the organization to
which they had belonged, is prohibited by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Slochower v. Board of Education1 4 an issue of equal in-
terest was posed. According to the Charter of the City of New
York, any employee of the city who utilized the privilege against
self-incrimination to avoid questions relating to official conduct
was subject to the following regulation: "His term or tenure of
office or employment shall terminate and such office or employ-
ment shall be vacant, and he shall not be eligible to election or
appointment to any office or employment under the city or any
agency."
Plaintiff, an employee in Brooklyn College, invoked the
privilege before hearings of the Internal Security Sub-Committee
held in New York City. The Chairman of the Committee an-
nounced that the hearings were limited to "considerations affect-
ing national security, which are directly within the purview and
authority of the sub-committee." Plaintiff was willing to testify
on matters of his association, or his beliefs since 1941, but not
concerning his membership during 1940 and 1941. To do so, he
affirmed, might tend to incriminate him. He declared that he
was not a member of the Communist Party. Summary dismissal
was the result of the plaintiff's action. While plaintiff argued
that he was entitled to notice, and to a hearing with the oppor-
tunity to explain his actions, the New York courts held that
notice was not required because the invocation of the Fifth
Amendment was "equivalent to resignation."
The Supreme Court held that the provision in question was
unconstitutional. The provision abridged a privilege or immu-
nity of a citizen of the United States since it imposed a penalty
on the exercise of a federally guaranteed right in a federal pro-
ceeding. Due Process was also violated in that the use of the
Fifth Amendment was not a proper basis for a state to terminate
employment.
Under this section of Senate Bill No. 2646, not only could
there be different rules in each state for state regulated schools,
but separate regulations for the various public and private
14 350 U. S. 551 (1956).
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schools, colleges and universities. All of this with no appeal
from the various state supreme courts.
Appellate Jurisdiction and Admission to the Bar
(5) any law, rule or regulation of any State, or of any
board of bar examiners, or similar body, or of any action
or proceeding taken pursuant to any such law, rule, or
regulation pertaining to the admission of persons to the
practice of law within such State.
In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California15 and Schwarz v.
Board of Examiners of New Mexico,16 the Supreme Court held
that "the mere fact of. . . [a person's] past membership in the
Communist Party . . . standing alone (and confronted by un-
contradicted testimony of high moral character) is not an ade-
quate basis for concluding that he is disloyal or a person of bad
character" and that a State denial of admission to the bar based
on a finding of bad moral character, resting on such evidence,
is arbitrary and without rational support and violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the New Mexico case, the State supported its refusal
on the grounds that applicant had been a member of the Com-
munist Party for several years before 1941, had used aliases,
had been arrested in 1934 for suspicion of criminal syndicalism,
and had been arrested and indicted in 1940 for recruiting for
Spanish Loyalists. Upon examination, the Court found that
applicant withheld no information from the Board of Bar Ex-
aminers but acted in the highest good faith in answering all
questions and submitted unimpeached testimony as to his good
character including a fine war record, good family, law school,
and community relations. The aliases were used, declared the
applicant, to avoid anti-Semitism in seeking employment.
Ruling upon these issues, the Court declared that neither
the aliases and arrests of over 15 years past, nor the old mem-
bership in the Communist Party at a time when Communists
were lawfully placed candidates on the ballot, constituted sup-
port for a current finding of bad moral character. Summarizing
the law, the Court found as follows: "A state cannot exclude a
person from the practice of law or from any other occupation in
a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. A
15 353 U. S. 252 (1957).
16 353 U. S. 232 (1957).
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol7/iss3/15
CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF SUPREME COURT
state can require high standards of qualifications, before it admits
an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a
rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to
practice law. Obviously an applicant could not be excluded
merely because he was a Republican or a Negro or a member
of a particular church. Even in applying permissible standards,
officers of the State cannot exclude an applicant where there is
no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these standards, or
when their action is invidiously discriminatory."
In the California case, the following facts prevailed. Konigs-
berg, although willing to state flatly that he did not and would
not advocate the overthrow of the United States Government by
force and violence, refused to answer questions put by the Com-
mittee of Bar Examiners concerning membership in the Com-
munist Party, editorials, and beliefs, on the ground that to re-
quire such answers illegally intruded upon his constitutionally
protected freedoms of speech, association, and belief. Finding
that the State of California had not based Konigsberg's exclu-
sion on his failure to answer, the Court proclaimed that the
evidence in the record did not "support any reasonable doubts
about Konigsberg's good character or his loyalty to the govern-
ments of State and Nation" which doubts had been made the
only basis for California's denial of his admission to the bar.
The substance of both cases is that the practice of law is
not a subject of a state's grace.
Conclusion
What is the ostensible purpose of this proposed legislation?
It has been argued variously that there are three prime objec-
tives to be attained. First, to reassert the authority of Congress
over matters which have been regarded as its indisputable pre-
rogative; second, to protect the constitutional status of other
branches of the government; and, third, to protect the rights of
the states from further encroachment by the federal government.
These positions are inapposite. There is no authority for
Congress or the Executive to reassert. All branches of the fed-
eral government are subject to the limitations of the Constitu-
tion. Under American jurisprudence, litigation of necessity aug-
ments the role of the judiciary. Judicial interpretation has added
to the expanse of Congressional as well as of Executive au-
thority. And yet, the fountainhead of judicial review of acts of
Congress arose when the Supreme Court refused to assume
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1958
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jurisdiction over matters not conferred upon it by the Constitu-
tion but over which the Congress attempted to give it jurisdic-
tion.17 The Court has had to ascertain if Congressional, State,
and Executive authority have evolved in conformity with prin-
ciples proclaimed in the Constitution and by prior decisions of
the Court. In Gibbous v. Ogden,'8 Chief Justice Marshall de-
fined "regulate," "commerce," and "among," as taken from the
interstate commerce clause, 19 with such scope as to encompass
the enormous growth made possible for subsequent federal con-
trol over matters within states which involve interstate com-
merce. Here the Court enlarged these words in such a manner
that Congress enhanced its surveillance to the present status.
And, one might add, Congress accepted this position willingly,
not by force. Similarly, the Executive has had its authority ex-
panded, as in the use of troops to enforce federal law20 and by
judicial interpretation the same is true regarding the breadth of
control over foreign affairs which resides in the Executive.
21
Alexander Hamilton urged in The Federalist22 that the
judiciary was incontestably the weakest of the three depart-
ments of government. The judiciary has neither force nor will,
but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid
of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments. Pro-
ceeding in this vein, Hamilton relates that it can never attack
with success either of the other two departments of government;
and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself
against their attack.
As for the final argument, was not the American Revolution
achieved in order to secure to the American people peace, liberty,
and safety? Was not this the lesson adroitly stated by James
Madison in The Federalist?23 Indeed, Madison exclaimed that as
far as the sovereignty of the states cannot be reconciled with
the happiness of the people, let the former be sacrificed to the
latter. Madison believed that the states would be more apt to
disrupt the balance in the State-Federal relation than the re-
verse.
17 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
18 9 Wheaton 1 (1824).
19 Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, U. S. Constitution.
20 G. H. Faust, The President's Use of Troops to Enforce Federal Law, 7
Clev.-Mar. L. R., 362 (1958).
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Underlining this, there are the constitutional guarantees of
individual rights for the people of the United States and those
subject to its laws. However, our Constitution only guarantees
trial by jury24 and not the right of appeal. Under the prevailing
system of law, our system promotes uniformity of application of
the law. This precept is denied under the proposed legislation.
Furthermore, it is doubtful if the whole of the Bill of Rights, as
well as the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and other constitutional safeguards, could be used as avenues of
appeal to the Supreme Court under the types of cases contem-
plated within the proposed legislation.
24 Article III, Section 2, and the Sixth Amendment, U. S. Constitution.
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